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xii TABLE OF CONTENTS II. DESCRIPTIVE AND CRITICAL ESSAYS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RUDOLF CARNAP 1. CHARLES MORRIS: "Pragmatism and Logical Empiricism" .. Rudolf Carnap - 1967 - Berkeley: University of California Press. The Logical Structure of the World and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy. E. A. R. - 1967 - Review of Metaphysics 21 (1):153-153. The Logical Structure of the World and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy. R. Nola - 1968 - Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 17:261-264. The Positivism of Carnap, Schlick and Feigl Very shortly thereafter, however, following his participation in the Vienna Circle discussions of Wittgenstein's Tractatus and its position that metaphysical statements are meaningless (unsinnig), Carnap explicitly commits himself to this view. In Pseudoproblems of Philosophy, written in 1927- Carnap, R., 1928/61, Der logische Aufbau der Welt * Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie (Weltkreis-Verlag, Berlin Schlachtensee, 1918; Second edn., Felix Meiner, Hamburg, 1961), English translation, The Logical Structure of the World * Pseudoproblems in Philosophy, University of California Press, Berkeley/Los Angeles, CA, 1967 For Carnap, a pseudo-problem is a philosophical question which, on the surface, handles concepts that refer to our world while, in fact, these concepts do not actually denote real and attested objects. In other words, these pseudo-problems concern statements that do not, in any way, have empirical implications. However, some key figures of early analytic philosophy, most notably Ludwig Wittgenstein and Rudolf Carnap, rejected this view, conceiving philosophical problems as logical or conceptual, and as involving, at least often, logical unclarities, misunderstandings or confusions. As Wittgenstein says in the Preface to the The failure of Carnap's approach is used to motivate Goodman's own preference for a system that begins with sensory qualities and seeks to construct particular experiences. Goodman's objections focus entirely on Carnap's constitution of the autopsychological domain. But the reason Carnap takes a dismissive attitude to metaphysics is a matter of controversy. I will argue that no reason is given in 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology', and this is because his reason for rejecting metaphysical debates was given in 'Pseudo-Problems in Philosophy' (1928). The argument there assumes verificationism, but I will argue that his argument survives the rejection of verificationism. The root of his argument is the claim that metaphysical Logicism - Rudolf Carnap Edgar Andrade Philosophy of Mathematics ILLC - Master of Logic. 3/23/2005 Rudolf Carnap 2 Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) • Born on May 18, 1891, in Ronsdorf, Germany. • A leading member of the Vienna Circle; In 1929, with Hans Hahn and Otto Neurath, he wrote the manifesto of the Circle. • In 1935, with the aid of the American philosophers Charles Morris and Willard and that require attention, from those that are (2) pseudo-problems that only resemble scientific ones, but are utterly meaningless and only cause linguistic confusion. The lexico